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POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAD A GENUINE CONFLICT BETWEEN HER WORK SCHEDULE 
AND THE TIME SHE NEEDED TO TEND HER CHILDREN 
Respondents argue that Plaintiff did not have any 
conflict between her work schedule and her need to tend her 
children. (Respondents' Brief, Point I beginning at 16) This 
argument is raised for the first time in Respondents' brief. 
Neither the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) nor the Board of 
Review based their decisions on lack of conflict between 
Plaintiff 's work schedule and the hours she needed to be home 
with her children. 
The ALJ held against Plaintiff because she felt 
Plaintiff should have done more in the way of trying to 
resolve the problem with her employer and attempting to find 
child care. The ALJ specifically held that: "Had the 
claimant talked with the employer on April 4, 1985, or made a 
more diligent effort to seek child care, she may have 
supported her case that she had no alternative but to quit." 
(R 23) This holding indicates that the ALJ understood that 
there was a real and genuine conflict between Plaintiff's 
schedule and her need to care for her children. 
The majority of the Board of Review "rubber 
stamped" the ALJ's decision with no specific findings of fact 
or conclusions of law. This can only mean that they reached 
the same conclusions as did the ALJ on the issue of conflict 
between work schedule and Plaintiff's need to care for her 
children. 
The dissenting member of the Board of Review 
specifically found that "claimant had no reasonable 
alternative but to leave work in order to care for [her] 
children." (R 12) The dissent therefore felt that a genuine 
conflict between Plaintiff's work schedule and her need to 
care for her children must have existed. 
To support their argument Respondents quote from 
the record. (Respondents' Brief at 17) However, it is 
sometimes difficult to tell exactly what was said from a cold 
transcript. Plaintiff's specific testimony indicates that 
Plaintiff worked from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. on Thursday, April 4, 
1985. (R 27) If read in the context of the whole record, the 
statement quoted by Respondents is more properly read, "I had 
Monday and, uh, Tuesday off. . . . Uh, Thursday [I worked 
from 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 11 o'clock at 
night.] and uh, Friday and Saturday I worked during the day." 
There is thus sufficient evidence in the record to show that, 
at the very least, Plaintiff worked from 3 to 11 p.m. 
Wednesday, Thursday, and Sunday, and worked the day shift 
Saturday. Plaintiff's children were in school Monday through 
Friday until around 3 p.m. This means that she had a conflict 
between work and her need to care for her children between 3 
p.m. and 11 p.m. on Wednesday and Thursday and a conflict on 
Saturday and Sunday no matter when she worked. 
Respondents further try to dispute the child care 
need by arguing that Plaintiff 's husband could have returned 
by the weekend. (Respondents' Brief at 19) The fact is that 
he did not. Plaintiff proffers that he was gone for over a 
month. 
However, the issue before this court is not whether 
Plaintiff 's husband acted unreasonably, but whether or not 
Plaintiff acted reasonably. Plaintiff had no control over 
her husband's actions. She should not be denied unemployment 
compensation because he acted unreasonably. Furthermore, 
instead of punishing Plaintiff, Respondents should be 
supportive of Plaintiff's husband's search for work, even if 
he did not use the best judgment in making arrangements at 
home before he left. 
POINT LL 
PLAINTIFF WAS A CREDIBLE WITNESS 
Respondents argue that because Plaintiff was 
confused at the time of the hearing she lacked credibility. 
(Respondents' Brief at 20) Respondents make their argument 
for the first time on appeal. The ALJ is specifically 
charged with determining the issue of credibility. Tne ALJ 
did not find that Plaintiff was nor credible. Nor did the 
Board of Review find that she was not: credible. 
The record indicates that Plaintiff was confused 
throughout the hearing process. Respondents admit the same 
in their brief: "The claimant's testimony about her hours of 
work is contradictory and confusing." (Respondents' Brief at 
8) However, being confused does not mean that one lacks 
credibility. 
Respondents argue that claimant must not be 
credible because her husband would not force her to give up 
the family's only source of income so that he could go look 
for work. (Respondents' Brief at 20) However, Plaintiff 
proffers that the jobs her husband was seeking would have 
provided more income in a few months than Plaintiff earned in 
a year. He had been unemployed for a long time. Perhaps he 
did not use the best judgment, but in his own mind the chance 
at a job was worth the risk and potential hardship. 
Plaintiff should not be punished because her husband 
unilaterally tried to take that risk. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S CONFLICT BETWEEN WORK SCHEDULE AND NEED TO CARE 
FOR HER CHILDREN DOES NOT DIFFER FROM THE CASES CITED IN HER 
BRIEF 
Respondent's argue that Plaintiff's case is 
different from the claimant's in Blakely v. Commonwealth 
Unemployment Comp. Bd., 76 Pa. Commw. 628, 464 A.2d 695 
(198 3) ; Hospital Services Ass'n. v. Commonwealth Unemployment 
Comp. Bd,y 83 Pa. Commw. 165, 476 A.2d 516 (1983); King v. 
Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd., 51 Pa. Commw. 3 96, 414 
X A.2d 452 (1980); and, Treffler v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 27 
Pa. Commw. 180, 365 A.2d 1341 (1976) because the claimants in 
those cases were the victims of their employers' actions. 
(Respondents' Brief at 22) 
However, Plaintiff's employer had notice from the 
day Plaintiff started that she needed to work a specific 
shift because she needed to care for her children. It was 
just a matter of time before her husband secured work and 
could no longer take care of the children while Plaintiff 
worked. At first she was not even going to accept the job 
because of the potential conflict but the employer talked her 
into it by promising her the next daytime shift opening. 
Several openings arose and the employer failed to keep his 
promise. The employer was directly responsible for Plaintiff 
conflict on April 4 and thereafter. (R 17-19 42) 
Furthermore, the employers in the cases cited above 
changed their work schedules because of pressures from 
outside forces. To argue that they were somehow responsible 
for the need to make the changes ignores the economic 
realities of their situations. The claimants in the cases 
cited and Plaintiff were all placed under compelling 
circumstances to quit as a result of outside economic forces 
on other persons. Whether or not these outside economic 
forces played upon Plaintiff 's employer or her husband is not 
relevant. Nowhere in Respondents' regulations governing 
"good cause" quit is there a requirement that the quit be 
specifically necessitated by the employer's acts. On the 
contrary,, the regulations specifically state: "There may be 
personal circumstances which are sufficiently compelling or 
create sufficient hardship to justify leaving work." 
Department of Employment Security Rules and Regulations, Rule 
A71-07-l:5(I)(G)(3) (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's need to quit was as compelling as the 
claimants in the cases cited above. Her need to quit was 
brought about by the empoyer's failure to live up to the 
employment contract and by Plaintiff's husband's unreasonable 
actions following a lengthy period of unemployment. To deny 
her benefits because of the actions of her employer or her 
husband is contrary to the intent of the actf the express 
language in the statute and regulations and would deny her 
due process under both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF HAS SHOWN BOTH MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND A 
CREDIBLE WORK SEARCH EFFORT 
With regards to the "equity and good conscience" 
provision of the act, Respondents argue that Plaintiff has 
failed to show mitigating circumstances. (Respondents' Brief 
at 25) 
However, Plaintiff attempted to work out her 
problems with her employer the day she left work and during 
the following week. The employer was not available, or if 
available made no attempt to return Plaintiff's calls. (R 29, 
28) Plaintiff also contacted the only persons who might be 
available to provide day care in her small isolated 
community. (R 22, 28) Unfortunately, she could not find any 
one to watch her children. 
Plaintiff has shown mitigating circumstances. The 
need to care for minor school age children where no 
alternative solution for child care nor employment could be 
worked out would motivate the reasonable person to arrange to 
be home to take care of her children herself. Plaintiff did 
just that. 
Nevertheless, Respondents argue that Plaintiff 
still should not be entitled to benefits under the equity and 
good conscience provision of the act because at the time of 
the hearing she did not have day care arranged and had not 
made a greater work search than calling potential employers 
on the phone, visiting potential employers whenever she could 
arrange transportation, and inquiring with the Employment 
Office as to who was hiring. (Respondents' Brief at 29-30) 
It is impossible for Plaintiff to arrange for 
someone to watch her children until she knows what her 
employment situation will be. Once employment is located 
Plaintiff should be able to arrange child care within certain 
parameters. Plaintiff is unskilled and fifty years old. She 
cannot expect to find a job substantially above minimum wage. 
Her family does not qualify for state day care assistance. 
She will not be able to afford a private day care center at 
several hundred dollars a month for each child. If she can 
find a weekday job she will probably be able to arrange for 
one or two hours care in the afternoon if needed. She may 
have to rely on her husband once again if she can only find 
evening work. Nevertheless, she will find a solution if 
possible. However, not having day care arranged at this 
point should not be grounds for denying benefits. 
As to Plaintiff's job search efforts, Respondents 
ignore the realities of Plaintiff's situation. Plaintiff is 
at the bottom end of the poverty scale. She lives in a 
community miles away from most potential employers. She is 
without transportation. She is without financial means to 
make a greater work search effort. Under the circumstances, 
she is doing everything she can to find a job. She has made 
a sufficient work search effort. 
POINT V 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS BECAUSE OF THE TELEPHONE 
HEARING 
Respondents argue that the prehearing literature 
mailed to Plaintiff sufficiently explained the hearing 
process so that no due process violations resulted from 
Plaintiff's telephone hearing. (Respondents' Brief beginning 
at 31) However, Respondents have failed to show that 
Plaintiff received the documents they discuss. 
Respondents discuss a "brochure11 and a "flyer" 
which they have attached as exhibits E and F to their brief. 
They state that these documents were enclosed with the notice 
of hearing to Plaintiff. There is no indication in the 
record that these documents were either sent or received. 
The document cited to by Respondents at R 37 does not have a 
copy of the brochure or flyer attached. Nor is there a copy 
of the brochure or flyer in the record. 
The notice of hearing at R 37 contains checklist of 
possible issues. One of the sections checked could refer to 
one of three totally separate and unrelated issues; just 
cause, good cause, or criminal acts. The notice is confusing 
and does not cle^arly set out the issues to be covered at the 
hearing nor what is to be expected in terms of the hearing or 
appeal process. 
As further support for their argument that the 
telephone hearing did not deny Plaintiff due process, 
Respondents state that Plaintiff was not confused and that 
the ALJ carefully asked the appropriate questions. 
(Respondents' Brief at 34) However, in their statement of 
facts they state that Plaintiff's testimony is confusing. 
(Respondents' Brief at 8) Their positions are contradictory. 
The record is confusing because Plaintiff was 
confused. The ALJ should have recognized this and simply 
continued the hearing to a time when Plaintiff could have 
been there in person. Continuing the hearing would not have 
infringed upon anyone's rights. The employer did not even 
bother to show up or arrange to be available for telephone 
call at the initial hearing. On the other hand, by not 
holding a hearing where Plaintiff could attend in person the 
ALJ has violated Plaintiff 's right to due process of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's family lives in poverty. Her husband 
has been unemployed for a substantial amount of time. She 
has therefore been left with providing the family support. 
She is unable to secure a high paying job because of her age 
and lack of education. She does not have the resources for 
expensive day care facilities. She lives in a community 
miles away from potential employers and child care providers. 
Upon hearing of job opportunies her husband 
immediate left for Nevada. He did not provide Plaintiff 
with any prior notice of his departure. He was gone for over 
a month. Plaintif was left with having to provide immediate 
care for her minor children. She attempted to arrange for 
child care but was unable to. She attempted to discuss the 
matter with her employer but the employer was not available. 
The employer had had months to arrange for 
Plaintiff to change to another shift where no conflict would 
have existed. The employer did not do this even though there 
were openings and the employer h^d promised to do so at the 
time Plaintiff was hired. 
Under the circumstances, Plaintiff had good cause 
to quit. She also meets the equity and good conscience 
standard under the statute. Plaintiff is entitled to 
unemployment compensation benefits. 
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